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"Learning to Govern ": The Texas
Experience
Tiffany Barnes & Timothy J. O'Neill
Southwestern Univers ity
The Republican
Party took control of the Texas House
of Representatives
for the first time in 130 yea rs on
Januar y 14 , 2003. How did the Texas House change as
the Republicans
learned how to be the majority
party
and the Democrats
struggled
with being the minority ?
The Texas House 's painful shift from a partially
bipartisan to a fully partisan
chamber
was not only the
product of inexperienced
Leadership and harsh partisan
bullying.
The changes
were Largely the product
of a
broader
pro cess of electoral
calculation
and co nse quent deinstitutionalization
affecting
man y other state
l eg islatures
that have not ex peri ence d recent shifts in
party control.

n January 14, 2003, the first Republican majority in 130
years took control of the Texas House of Representatives. How did the Texas House change as the Republican Party assumed the role of the majority party and the Democrats the role of the minority party? For the previous twenty years
the Texas House operated as a partially bipartisan rather than a
partisan legislature, unlike the modem U.S. House of Represen tatives. Did the Texas House continue the tradition under new
management, or did it become increasingly partisan? Why? In
brief, what were the significant changes and continuities in the
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Texas House as the parties switched their roles?
Our thesis is that, while the Texas House did suffer from inexperienced leadership and harsh partisan bullying, the changes
in the House were part of a broader pattern of electoral calculation and consequent deinstitutionalization affecting many other
state legislatures that have not experienced recent shifts in party
control. We studied the 2003 regular session (January through
June) of the Texas House and explored the impact of electoral
calculations and party agendas on how fundamental norms, procedures, and rules changed and how the two parties operated
within these changes. In particular, we examine rule and norm
changes dealing with seniority, motions to amend, the House
Speaker's powers, points of order, calls for recorded floor votes,
and the use of quorum calls. Our article tests three explanations
for the increase in partisanship and incivility during this session:
the "Fenno" explanation that stresses leadership inexperience,
the "DeLay" explanation that blames U.S. House Majority
Leader Tom DeLay's intrusions into the Texas House's deliberations, and the "deinstitutionalization" explanation that emphasizes the paramountcy of external over institutional goals and
demands (Rosenthal, 1996a).
Approach

We employ qualitative measures of changes in key norms,
rules and procedures using a combination of participantobservation and elite interviews. Telephone interviews conducted
in 2004 supplement this data. We did not use conventional voting
analyses because the Texas House does not record floor votes
unless there is an appeal from the members. Since partisan or
electoral motives prompt such appeals, they do not present a representative sample of voting on the House floor.
Interviews were conducted with thirty-one individuals during
the 2003 regular session. Seventeen were members of the 2003
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House of Representatives , 12 Republicans and 5 Democrats .
Seven were staff members in House offices or the House itself.
Seven were either directors of advocacy groups or journalists.
Additional interviews were conducted in 2004 with 19 members of the House (14 Democrats, 5 Republicans). Democrat and
minority representatives were over-sampled to offset the potential bias of the original 2003 pool. Results from the 2004 interviews are used to test statements and assertions made by the
original interviewees, especially those relating to the data collected in Tables 2-5. However, since respondents' views may
have been tainted by the partisan battles over congressional redistricting that consumed much of the summer sessions, the 2004
responses are not merged with the responses gathered during the
2003 regular session. While the 2004 responses largely confirm
views of the 2003 cohort, significant differences are analyzed
below.
We used a semi-structured interviewing protocol. All respon dents were asked questions and appropriate follow-up prompts
from a standard list. They were encouraged to discuss topics and
to make observations beyond those listed in our protocol. The
protocol was pre-tested in a small number of initial interviews
and then refined before being applied to the interviews discussed
here.
/
Our analysis relies upon these interviews, supplemented by
news accounts about, and our own observations of, the session.
Opinions expressed that were not supported by news accounts or
participant observations are not used as evidence. The elimination of such opinions, along with nonresponsive comments on
some questions, explains the differing number of responses in
our Tables.
\ ' OL. 34 2006
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Fenno Versus DeLay: The Conventional Explanations
The Texas House's problems during its regular session could
be explained by two, not wholly contradictory, explanations. The
"Fenno" explanation builds upon Richard Fenno's argument that
four decades of being out of power left U.S. House Republicans
without the experience they needed to properly interpret their
electoral victory or govern the country once they became the majority in 1995. The "Tom DeLay Did It" explanation stressed the
division caused by U.S. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay
pressuring Texas House Speaker Tom Craddick to ram a congressional redistricting plan through the 2003 regular session.
Both explanations purport to explain the rise in friction, decline
in civility, and the breakdown of bipartisan norms in the Texas
House.
The 1995 Republican majority in the U.S. House was able to
pass some of its "Contract with America," the campaign promises that may have helped Republicans win an upset election in
1994, but the House leadership failed to exploit the natural advantages of being a new party in power. They could not avoid the
1995 government shutdown that weakened the new Republican
majority while strengthening their Democratic opponent, President Bill Clinton . Fenno (1997, 2) explains the Republicans'
failures in terms of the lack of institutional leadership skills. An
extended duration of one-party control produces consequences
once there is a change in party control: confrontational leadership behavior, deterioration in cross party civility, and decline in
public confidence of legislatures as an institution.
Members of the minority party must decide how to adapt to
their new place in the House. Fenno (1997, 13) recognizes two
strategies for adapting to the role of the minority. He identifies
the first as "institutional partisans" who try to accommodate the
majority by working within the rules in an attempt to influence
the agenda. The second are the "confrontational partisans" who
TIIE JOURNAL
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attempt Looppose any legislation proposed by the majority with
the goal of driving the majority from power .
Fenno's solution to these problems is regular exchange of
party control. There are two crucial features, claims Fenno
(1997, 9), of a majority-minority relationship: the majority party
organizes and runs the House and the minority party adapts to
the governing majority. When both parties alternate being in the
majority and having power, they are more likely to consult, cooperate and compromise with the other party. A sense of reciprocity develops. Moreover, the expertise the new majority needs
to govern the House can only be gained through "trial and error
of those who have held power" (Fenno, 1997, l 6-18, 20). This
relationship does not develop when one party is in the majority
for an extended duration of time and does not foresee becoming
the minority.
In 1998 the Republican takeover of the Florida state legislature confronted a similar challenge. Tom Feeney, the speaker of
Florida's House, sent a cautionary message in 2002 to the Republican majority in the Texas House. "I became convinced that
voters really didn't want a conservative revolution. They wanted
a conservative evolution." He concludes by warning, "You have
got to be for change and that change has to be conservative
change." 1
The Fenno explanation would argue that the Texas House Republicans' inexperience, their lack of training as legislative,
committee, and institutional leaders, caused the breakdown of
rules and norms in the Texas House . If only the Texas House Republicans had interpreted their victory differently and had more
experience in governing, then they would have approached their
agenda with more prudence and made fewer mistakes.

1

Herman (2002. A I). See also Jewett (2002).
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There are several problems with applying the Fenno explanation to the difficulties experienced in the 2003 Texas House.
Unlike the increasingly partisan U.S. House in the 1980s and
1990s, the Texas House underwent a shift to a more bipartisan
status during this period. Moreover, while the Republican majority did stumble in its efforts to manage the House, the Democrat
minority's problems were at least as crucial to the breakdown of
bipartisanship in the 2003 regular session.
The Texas House of Representatives has been a partially bipartisan legislature since the early l 980s.2 A fully bipartisan legislature would create an agenda that entertains issues important
to both parties, issues that generate support not specific to party
ideologies only, and would share power among the parties proportional to the number of seats each party holds. A partisan legislature is one in which power and legislative success is sharply
defined by partisan allegiances, with the majority party dominating both the structure and the agenda of the institution.
The former Democratic majority did share some power with
the old Republican minority. Republicans served as chairs and
vice-chairs on legislative committees and some were members of
the highest leadership circles. A loose coalition of conservative
and moderate Democrats worked with Republican members to
advance legislative agendas common to all. However, this bipartisan relationship was not a complete one. Committee chairs
were not distributed according to numeric proportions. Nonetheless, unlike the U.S. House Republican leadership, the senior
Texas House Republicans were often experienced in chairing
committees and in House rules, norms, and procedures. A few
2

While this is a common perception shared by many legislators , observers, and scholars,
not all agree . For example Representative Arlene Wohlgemuth (R-Burleson) characterized this era as "a disguised partisanship ." Interview with Representative Arlene Wohlgemuth, July JO, 2003 . For a brief history of the Texas House during the 1980s and early
1990s, see Hamm and Harmel ( 1993).
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first term Republicans were appointed to committee chairs. They
did not have such expertise.
Republican campaign promises were few, specific, and expressed fundamental principles of Texas populism-a distrust of
government ("no new truces"), a distrust of some corporations
and lawyers (home insurance and medical tort reform), and less
broadly affirmed, sensitivity to the concerns of the pro-life
movement. There was no radical agenda to remake Texas government corresponding to the 1994 Republican "Contract with
America."
The Texas Republicans seem to have learned the lesson
taught by Newt Gingrich's problems, and reinforced by the experience of the Florida legislature: evolution, not revolution,
was their goal. The senior Republican leaders were experienced,
not novices, and the Republican freshmen generally followed the
leadership. The Fenno explanation does not seem fully adequate
to explain what happened in the Texas House.
The "Tom Delay Did It" explanation has less scholarly warrant but is founded in a widespread, elite media assertion that
inside Washington, D.C., "Beltway politics" afflicted the Texas
House. Media accounts and pundits' columns saw the sinister
hidden hand of Tom DeLay in the redistricting debacle that
caused the House to grind to a halt on May 17 when 58 of the 62
House Democrats refused to appear on the floor for a quorum
call (Dubose and Reid, 2004). Allegedly, DeLay's bullying contributed to the breakdown of bipartisan norms in the Texas
House, causing not only a decline in civility but eventually a collapse of the legislative process when most Democratic representatives refused to appear for the quorum call.
While neither Congressman DeLay nor the Texas House
leadership ever admitted to the key role he played in pushing
redistricting, memos released on the eve of the court challenge to
the congressional redistricting plan show that DeLay was the
\'OL.
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principal force behind redistricting (Pasztor and Herman, 2003;
Copelin, 2004). No doubt strong-arming and partisan bullying
occurred. But the decline in civility and consensus-producing
norms in the House began well before the push for redistricting.
Media fixation on Tom DeLay's role may be more simply explained by public and media cynicism about any kind of power
play on topics such as redistricting. Ronald Weber (I 999, 610)
argues that because state legislators must make policy that directly affects their interests (redistricting, pay raises, rules governing lobbyists), "public confidence in the institution and
individual members" is undermined and the media are encouraged to "highlight any alleged abuses of legislative life."
While DeLay's actions may have helped to push the House
down the slippery slope of partisan conflict, it was neither the
sole nor primary factor. The penetration of electoral politics and
competition into the House process, the resulting deinstitutionalization of the Texas House, and the growing suspicion of each
party by the other party can be explained by factors that seem to
affect many contemporary state legislatures. The Texas House is
not unique in suffering a breakdown in norms of civility and reciprocity. In brief, "Tom" did not do it. Contemporary state legislative politics did it.
Although there were specific aspects of the members' conduct
that are explained by Fenno's concerns about inexperienced
leadership and DeLay's use of hardball tactics, the Texas House
shared in the process of deinstitutionalization, increasing partisanship, and the decline of civility common to many state legislatures over the past twenty years (Moncrief, Thompson, and
Kurtz, 1996).

The Alternative Explanation: Texas as the Norm
The legislative process is based on antagonistic cooperation.
Rules, norms, and procedures are pivotal factors in creating the
TIIE JOURNAL
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right kind of antagonistic cooperation. These factors create incentives and disincentives for the legislature's members, molding
their behavior in predictable ways . Individual ambitions and
goals, mediated by rules, procedures, norms, and committee and
party organizations, impose some degree of stability on decisionmaking.
Rules are bargaining chips in the negotiations that get legislation through the legislature . They convey different sets of advantages and disadvantages to different participants in the policy
process . Rules also express what behaviors are acceptable and
what goals are permissible. Rules help to mold outcomes by determining what alternatives are allowed to be considered and
voted on, thereby facilitating or impeding the success of the
various players in the organization. Rules are explicit, but norms
constitute the unwritten rules of the game, the shared understandings that determine what is and is not acceptable behavior.
While written rules and unwritten norms are important, factors external to the legislature such as elections also have profound impact on the policy decisions made in a legislature.
Indeed, it is the external factor of electoral pressure that is forcing major changes in the internal workings of state legislatures.
Alan Rosenthal (1996a, 190) observes that increasing party
competition for state legislatures, accompanied by increasing
partisan conflict within state legislatures, have shifted members'
concerns away from the needs of the legislature as an institution
to the specific electoral and policy objectives of their parties.
This contributes, in Ronald Hedlund's (1984, 67) words, to the
decline of legislative "norms regarding debate and member interaction," producing "exchanges that are blunt and often threatening." Joel Thompson and Gary Moncrief (1992, 196-7) also
find that legislatures are exposed to increasing outside pressures
to which they must adapt. Thus, legislatures' efforts to adapt create increasing pressures within the legislatures.
\'OL. 34 2006
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The literature on state legislatures now widely recognizes that
there is diminished institutionalization within state legislatures.
"In the past few years," Rosenthal() 998, 72) observes,
legislatures [are] becoming more permeable and more likely
to have outside influences penetrate internal structures and
processes. Indeed, the environment can no longer be kept
outside of the legislature but has become, or is becoming, an
integral part of life and business within the legislature.

Rosenthal (1998, 173) concludes that
Pressures from without [notably from the media and the public] ... have succeeded in limiting terms and careers, in eroding whatever normative system might have existed earlier,
and in wrestling away legislative control from internal management. No longer can many state legislative bodies be
characterized ... as an organization that displaces goals and
focuses on internal processes at the expense of external demands. No longer can it be said, if it ever could be said, that
the state legislature is an end value itself rather than an instrument for pursuit of other values.

This pattern of deinstitutionalization is found among state
legislatures that have experienced recent changes in party control
such as Florida, 11linois, and Minnesota, and in state legislatures
that have no 4 such as California, Massachusetts, Utah, and New
Hampshire (Rosenthal, 1989; 1996b; 1998). In some cases, deinstitutionalization was abetted by causes in addition to electoral
pressures and calculations. For example, Thompson, Kurtz, and
Moncrief (1996) found that professionalization of legislators'
staffs and longer career interests may contribute to deinstitutionalization. But they also conclude that "politicization," a concept
similar to our emphasis on electoral calculations and pressures,
had an independent and powerful effect (Moncrief, Thompson,
and Kurtz, 1996). This last finding is especially pertinent to the
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Texas House since it has undergone no appreciable professionalization over the last twenty years (Hamm and Harmel, 1993).
In brief, many state legislatures are experiencing the phenomenon of "deinstit utionalization ," where the notion of the institution as an end in itself is overshadowed by the demands of
its environment and external demands replace internal goals
(Ronsenthal, 1996a, 185, 194-5). This breakdown of the norms,
values, and procedures that form the unseen walls separating an
institution from its environment is near universal in state legislatures. The change in the dynamics and goals of electoral calculations is one of the major factors prompting deinstitutionalization.

The Impact of Electoral Calculations and Goals
The Texas House in the 1980s and 1990s may have been an
anomaly. Unlike other state legislatures that became more election-oriented and experienced deinstitutionalization and growing
partisanship, the Texas House became partially bipartisan during
these two decades. Part of this had to do with the shifting balance within the House. As Republicans gained strength they
formed a coalition with moderate and conservative Democrat s on
issues that appealed to the center-right. George W. Bush's governorships were times of strong personal connections between the
Republican executive and the Democrat House Speaker, Pete
Laney. The 1990s was also a period of sustai ned economic
growth and rising tax revenues, permitting expansions of state
budgets without forcing confrontations over who wins and loses.
But all these factors disappeared by January 2003.
Texas' financial crisis in 2003 sharpened the ideological and
partisan polarization in the House. The Texas House confronted a
difficult session in 2003 even without the change in party control. The state budget was almost ten billion dollars in deficit.
The sluggish economy and rising unemployment placed greater
demands on social services while lowering revenues. The school
\'OL. 34 2006
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finance system needed reform, especially property tax relief.
Newly elected House Speaker Tom Craddick, the first Republican speaker since 1873, characterized the hardships facing the
House.
We are facing billions of dollars in shortfall, the retirement
of 16 committee chairs after the last session of the Legislature, and 76 percent of our House members having never
served with a deficit. There will be a learning curve. 3

Finally, the defeat or retirement of moderate and conservative
Democrats and their replacement by conservative Republicans in
recent years emptied the ideological center in the Texas House.
The old coalition of moderate Republicans and Democrats was
gone, creating a more polarized House.
The 2003 Texas House manifested the behavior of other state
legislatures that have become more election-oriented. Commenting on general trends in state legislatures, Alan Rosenthal (2002,
6, 8) found that
legislative campaign committees, under the direction of legislative party leaders, are now the principal source of party
assistance to legislative candidates in tough races .... Leaders are more preoccupied with campaigns and elections.
With campaigning infusing the process, civility is on the decline. Because the environment has changed, socializing
across party lines .. .is much diminished.

Leadership roles have correspondingly shifted from facilitating
the passage of legislation to becoming campaign finance providers and facilitators (Squire, 1992).
The general literature stresses how electoral competition has
reinforced policy and ideological differences, "crystallizing
rather than resolving divergent partisan views. This trend may
3

Quoted in Hennan (2003).
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render deliberation and negotiation parts of the process less important, while the exploitation of issues for the purpose of partisan electoral gain becomes more important" (Squire, 1992, 192).
The 2003 regular session reflected this trend.
Part of the tension in the Texas House sprang from this growing emphasis on electoral outcomes. There were different views
of how these changes affected the Texas House in 2003. It is
clear that Tom Craddick was seeking to build a Republican majority in the Texas House. As a rising leader Craddick adopted an
aggressive recruitment strategy. He and his close advisors, in
concert with sympathetic business and policy groups, were key
actors in recruiting, funding, and advising Republican opponents
challenging Democrat incumbents or competing for open seats.
Former House Speaker Pete Laney (D-Hale Center) explained, "We have never had members in the legislature campaign against one another." Tom Craddick had been removed
from Laney's leadership team not because he had campaigned
against Laney. "He has always campaigned against me, and .. .I
still gave him leadership positions. But when he started to defeat
4
others is when I busted him." The fact that Craddick and other
Republican members publicly supported Laney's opponent in the
previous election no doubt also influenced Laney. Representative
Mike Krusee (R-Round Rock) viewed things differently. According to him, Laney seemed to be saying, "Republicans are not
allowed to seek a majority during the electoral session. They
must be bipartisan during the session and the election." 5
An essential component of both the Fenno and DeLay explanations is the vulnerability of freshmen legislators to leadership
pressures. Newt Gingrich had worked long and hard to recruit
4

interview with Representative Pete Laney (D-Hale Center) , former Speaker of the Texas
House of Representatives, July I, 2003.
Interview with Representative Mike Krusee (R-Round Rock), June 23, 2003.

5
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and fund Republican opponents to sitting U.S. House Democrats
in the years before the 1994 Republican congressional landslide.
Both out of ideological commitment and personal loyalty, they
backed Gringrich's first year as the confrontational speaker of
the U.S. House. Fenno saw this as one of the costs of inexperienced leaders and followers. The DeLay explanation builds upon
this same dynamic, arguing that the Majority Whip of the U.S.
House sought to take advantage of the 26 new Republican members of the Texas House, pressuring them to take up the redistricting fight.
The relationship between Speaker Craddick's leadership team
and the freshmen in the House was a symbiotic one. "The leadership took care of the freshmen." 6 But few freshmen Republicans
gave Craddick or lobbyists credit for their election. The freshmen insisted that they wanted to win and they got into the House
themselves. One journalist and some veteran Democrats in the
House saw the freshmen Republicans as anxious about their reelection prospects in future primaries. These respondents believed that there were unspoken threats that if freshmen did not
toe the line and vote with the Speaker, they would face wellfunded challengers in the next Republican primary. 7 Because of
gerrymandering, two-thirds of House incumbents routinely face
little or no electoral competition after the primary. 8
Freshmen Republicans, Speaker Craddick, and other observers disagreed. Freshmen respondents unanimously said that abiding by their campaign promises was a primary factor influencing
their conduct as legislators and their votes. Representative Dan
Branch, himself a freshman Republican, offered the clearest ex• Interview with Representative Mike Hamilton (R-Mauriceville), July 3, 2003.
1
Interview with Harvey Kronberg, publisher and editor, Quorum Report, July 12, 2003 .
K Niemi and Winsky ( 1987); Carey , Niemi , and Powell (2003) ; Weber, Tucker, and Brace
(1991); Rhodes (2000, 88); Hamm and Moncrief(2004, 165).
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planation of the freshmen's relationship with the Speaker.
Freshmen Republicans "had a close relationship with the
Speaker; it was also his freshman year as Speaker." The freshmen's votes were responsible for putting the Speaker into office.
"He owes this speakership to us." It was also true that many
freshmen owed their campaigns to Craddick. He had helped
them with their elections. Craddick identified candidates with the
same political ideologies, they pledged to be on his team, and in
return he helped them with their election. But they had repaid
that debt by pledging to support his election . The strongest bond
they shared was the same political base. This ideological and
political bond tied the freshmen to the Speaker, even at times
when more veteran Republican legislators were "skipping out"
on tough votes. 9
Other legislators and observers agreed. The freshmen Republicans were a "like-minded recalcitrant group of individuals"
who were not "paying off loyalties." 10 "We" shared values and
core beliefs; a common "like-mindedness." The Speaker would
explain why the freshmen should support a bill but cautioned
them, "You should represent your people." 11 Representative
Mike Hamilton (R-Mauriceville) explains Craddick's role as
more of a mentor. He was there to answer questions and help
12
candidates find contacts to raise money for their campaign.
Shared campaign promises and ideological beliefs forged the
bonds between the Speaker and his freshmen Republican followers.
The same respondents also asserted that their ideological
commitments were key. Reelection anxieties were less important
• Interview with Representative Dan Branch (R-Dallas), July 8, 2003 .
0
'
Interviews with Wayne Slater, Austin bureau chief, Dallas Morning News, July 12,
2003 ; John Pojman , Director , Texas Alliance for Life, June 19, 2003.
11
Interview with Representative Larry Phillips (R-Sherman), July 2, 2003 .
12
Interview with Representative Mike Hamilton (R-Mauriceville) , July 3, 2003.
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than their perceived obligation to stand by the commitments they
made in the last election. There was bloc voting, but the voting
was a strategy expressive of common values and the desire to
have impact as an "effective voting bloc." 13 Representative
Branch explained that freshmen constituted one third of the
House Republicans and had the ability to swing the vote any way
they wanted. Representative Krusee observed that there was a
conscious decision by the freshmen to act together to have leverage on policy. He also noted that freshmen may have been more
attentive to campaign promises because they knew they had not
14
cultivated incumbency advantage. Additionally, it is normal for
freshmen legislators, regardless of party affiliation or governmental level, to be more ideological and more partisan in their
voting behavior. 15
The freshman Republicans came to the Texas House moved
more by a common agenda than bonded by a common loyalty to
the new Speaker. Their agenda captured the essence of the mainstream of the Texas Republican Party. It was not a Texan version
of the "Contract with America" but a set of legislative initiatives
that had won some partial victories in earlier sessions.
The Meaning of Changes in Rules, Norms, and Proce dures

The 2003 regular session of the Texas House began with a
number of significant rule and procedural changes. More important were changes in how rules were interpreted and applied.
Representative Jerry Madden (R-Plano) stressed that while these
changes in content and interpretation were important, the first
year of Laney's speakership in 1993 was when most of the significant rule changes took place. 16 Representative Pete Laney
13

Interview with Branch .
Interview with Krusee.
,s Jenkins (2002); Snyder and Groseclose (2000); Kingdon ( 1989, 81, 114).
16
Interview with Representative Jerry Madden (R-Plano), July 1, 2003.
14
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insisted, "I don't think we saw many changes in the House rules.
I think we saw many changes in the interpretation of the House
rules." 17
An ad hoc committee of House members 18 proposed abandoning "substantial compliance." The substantial compliance
rule gave the Speaker the power to override points of orders on
technicalities, such as grammatical errors in a bill, that would
delay the process of the bill by sending it back to committee for
revision. The committee also recommended abandoning the seniority rule for appointments to the powerful Appropriations
Committee. The House passed both rule changes.
The ad hoc committee's motives for abandoning substantial
compliance are clear. Speaker Craddick wanted it gone and so
did the House Democrats. The effect of the removal is less clear.
The rule change was intended to "empower the rninority." 19
Moreover, the change returned the House to its traditional practice, a practice that had been abandoned when the rule was first
implemented in 1999. Its practical effects are less clear. House
Parliamentarian Steve Collins felt that the Speaker's power to
deny points of order over minor mistakes is "implied in the [existing House] rules." 20 Others argued that the change narrowed
the Speaker's discretion and "empowered" the minority "to delay and disrupt" through frequent points of order, a tool that
would be valuable for the minority but something the Republicans could not use effectively in previous sessions because of the
substantial compliance rule.2' Table 1 demonstrates that the reverse actually happened. While the number of points of order
17

Interview with Laney.
conflict whether it was staffed with supporters of the Speaker or open to any
member of the House.
1
• Interview with Steven Rains , Office of the Governor, June 18, 2003 .
20
Interview with Steve Collins , House Parliamentarian, June 12, 2003.
21
Interview with Krusee.
IK Accounts
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increased over the past three regular sessions, the percentage sustained dropped. The rule change seemed to empower the
Speaker, not the minority.
Table 1*
Points of Order

Regum
SeHort

nt'
January 9-

May 3 1, 1999

May 28. 200 1

11

PoinlsofQw-

Suslam:I
WrtWrawn
Over-Ruled

7ft'

7(/'
Janu ary 12-

31
13

JO
8

%
42%
32%
26%

11

71
27
22
22

%
38%
31%
31%

January 14June 2 , 2003

n
85
28
21
36

%
33%
25%
42 %

*Table I is constructedon data fromthe 2003 HouseJrumal availablelhroughthe Texas Legislative

Coorx:il.
'Texas LegislatureOnline," http://www.capitolstate.tx.us/.

Republican and Democratic legislators agreed that there were
a higher number of points of order; they differed over the motives for raising such points . The biggest increase in points of
order occurred between the 76 th and the 77 th sessions, an indication of the increasingly partisan nature of House debates during
the 77 th session. The percentage over-ruled also increased substantially. Our 2003 interviews found that Republican legislators,
staffers from both parties, and non-legislative observers saw the
frequent points of order made during the regular session as a tactic to obstruct debate, not to develop good policy. Democratic
legislators disagreed (Table 2). Our 2004 interviews reflected a
similar breakdown, although either fading or more temperate
memories prompted a milder partisan division among our respondents.
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Laney in 1993.24 The previous rule guaranteed senior members
of the House half of the seats on the committee if they wanted
them. The new rule eliminated seniority as a criterion. The
Speaker now chooses all the members. Legislators of both parties and their staff characterized the change as one increasing the
Speaker 's power while undercutting Democratic influence.
Table3
Effects of Eliminating Seniority Rule, 2003 & 2004
(in percents)

2003
Increased
Speaker 's
Power

Did Not

Republican Legislators and
7 1 (n = 5)
29 (n = 2)
Staffers
Democratic Legislators and
JOO(n = 5)
0
Staffers
*Note: No staffers were intervi ewed for the 2004 sample.

2004*
Increased
Speaker's
Powe.r

Did Not

80 (n = 4)

20 (n = I)

100 (n =
14)

0

The impact of this change was immediate . Several senior liberal Democrat s no longer found seats on the committee. The indirect effects are more ambiguous. The rule change either took
away institutional memory from the Democratic left and weakened advocacy for old policies ,25or got rid of individuals who
had "become experts at generating funds for their thing." 26 Most
agreed that the change made the Appropriations Committee chair
stronger since committee members knew less about procedures
and budget processes . Others point out that the previous session's Appropriation Committee chair held a tighter rein on the
committee than did Representative Talmadge Heflin , the chair
24

lnterview with Collins.
'-' Interview with Kronberg.
26
Interview with Madden.
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Table2
Purposes of Points of Order, 2003 & 2004
(in percents)

2003
Used
to
Obstruct

No Effort
to
Obstruct

Republican Legislators
73 (n = 8)
27 (n = 3)
and Staffers
Democratic Legislators
33 (n = I)
67 (n = 2)
IOO(n=4 )
Non-Leeislative Observers
0
*Note : No staffers were interviewed for the 2004 samele.

2004*
Used
to
Obstruct

No Effort
to
Obstruct

80 (n =4)

20 (n = I)

50(n=4)

50 (n = 7)

Speaker Craddick increased the number of standing commit tees by four to a total of thirty-seven . Parliamentarian Steve
Collins pointed out that it is rare for a Speaker to create new
committees in his first term. Speakers usually cut back on committees in their first sessions and then expand in later sessions. 22
The increase in committees caused problems for Republicans
because the rule permitting members no more than two substantive committee assignments meant that each committee had a
smaller membership. The change also meant that new and therefore less experienced Republican members chaired more committees, weakening the accumulated expertise that older, usually
Democratic, chairs had possessed. It also both strengthens and
weakens the Speaker's power. He has more plums such as chair
positions to award supporters but also must coordinate a larger
number of committees. 23
Speaker Craddick and the ad hoc rules committee centralized
power in the House Appropriations Committee by changing the
seniority rule established by Democratic House Speaker Pete

22
23

Interview with Collins .
Interview with Steven Rains, Office of the Governor , June 18, 2003 .
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during the 78 th session. 27 Journalist Harvey Kronberg (2002) saw
the first real evidence of a decline in civility in the House when
Republican legislators began to talk about revising the seniority
rule for the Appropriations Committee. The demotion of so many
senior Democrats from one of the most powerful House committee was seen, according to Kronberg, as one of the first significant breaks with bipartisan norms.
It was clear that the breakdown of civility and bipartisanship
did begin early in the House session despite Speaker Craddick's
apparent efforts to create a bipartisan process . There was evidence at the beginning of the 2003 regular session that the House
would continue to be partially bipartisan. Speaker Craddick assured members that, "While partisan issues may arise from time
to time, legislative actions, and certainly legislative leadership ,
must be truly bipartisan" (quoted in Quorum Report, 2003a). His
declaration was followed by a series of conflicting actions testing the new Speaker's commitment to bipartisanship. Three days
after his announcement, the House voted to strengthen the
Speaker by allowing him to appoint all the members of the Appropriations Committee. Senior Democrats were denied seats on
this key committee that would have been theirs under the old
seniority rule . On the other hand, Speaker Craddick released the
committee assignments for the new session on January 30, appointing sixteen Democrats to committee chairs. The percentage
of Democratic chairs equaled the percentage of seats Democrats
held in the new House. Under the previous speaker, Democrat
Pete Laney, Republicans held only one-third of these leadership
positions, significantly less than the forty-eight percent of the
seats they held in the House. Nonetheless, few of these Democrat
chairs held significant power. For example, Representative Ron
Wilson, an African-American Democrat from Houston, was ap27

[nlerview with Rains.
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pointed chair of the Ways and Means Commjttee, normally one
of the most influential committees in the House. However, the
united Republican leadership's "no new taxes" pledge largely
made Ways and Means irrelevant in the 2003 session.
The chairman of the House Democratic Caucus, Jim Dunnam, did not give Craddkk much credit for his attempt. When
commenting on Craddick's committee assignments Dunnam declared, "any semblance of fairness or bipartisansrup is just a fayade" (quoted in Slover, 2003). Despite the authenticity of
Craddick's efforts or the credibility ofDunnam's allegations, it is
evident that there was a strong tension between Republican and
Democratic leadership from the beginning of the session.
There were also changes in how the rules were used by members, especially Democrats. Table 4 shows that there was a 48%
increase in the number of motions to amend offered during the
78 th regular session as compared with the 77 th . There was an
even more dramatic 68% increase in the ratio of amendments
offered per bill. The appropriation bill, the reorganization of
health and human services, and the tort reform bills were each
subjected to more amendments than any bill during the two previous sessions. Overwhelmingly, and unlike the prior two sessions, motions to amend came from one party-the House
Democrats.
A large majority of our respondents from both years said that
motions to amend were not used to prevent bad policy, and all
but Democratic legislators went on to state that the intent was to
obstruct floor debate. Minority Leader Dunnam recounted that
Democrats were forced to offer so many amendments because
Republicans refused to compromise before the debate came to the
floor. They were not open to the committee process. 28 Parliamen28

Interview with Representative Jim Dunnam (D-Waco) , Democratic Minority Leader.
June 30, 2003 .
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tarian Collins reports that some amendments were "used for both
purposes," to advance policies and to delay Republican actions. 29

Table4*
Motions to Amend
~
Amendnms Offered
BillsRfceivingMctkn<;
toAmend
Raioof AmromertstoBills
Billsroceiving
highestnuml:x:Y
c:inrtirns toamro:
SB4 (Sdm! Rnarre)
SB7 (E]ectricUtility
De-

Regulalioo)
HB 1(Awcµi.-ims)

January 12-

January 9-

May 31, 1999
1,548
536
2.89

May 28 , 2001
1,686
597
2.82

January 14June 2, 2003

2,489
525
4 .74

98
69
67

SB 1(Appupialims)
HB2912(N!tUralRenuces)
SB2 (Qwnd Wim~ Districts)

116
87
55
352

HBI(~)
HB2292(Health300Human
5eMcesRfagll1imion)
HB4(fotRffam)

159
154

*Table4 is consttuctedfromdata on Housebills300ameoomenlSavailablethroughtheTexas LegislativeCouncil,'Texas LegislatureOnline,"ht1p://www
.C11pit0Lstate.tx.us/
.

Representative Krusee believed that Democrats hung themselves
with the large number of amendments, undermining their credibility so that no one was listening when they proposed a '"good
faith' amendment that wasn't for obstruction." Krusee also argued that the 154 amendments proposed on HB4, the tort reform

29

Email from Collins, dated August 19, 2004 .
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bill, were "designed not to win on policy ... [but] on politics ."30
Representative Branch agreed, believing that Democrats sought
to propo se amendments that would place Republicans in politically embarr assing positions at the next election .
Table 5
Purpose of Democrats' Motions to Amend, 2003 & 2004
(in percents)

2003
Used in
Effort to
Obstruct

Not in
Effort To
Obstruct

Republican Legislators and
9 1 (n = 10)
9 (n = I )
Staffers
Democratic Legislators and
25 (n = 2)
75 (n = 6)
Staffers
*Note: No staffers were interviewed for the 2004 samele.

2004*
Used in
Effort to
Obstruct
100 (n =
5)
29 (n = 4)

Not in
Effort to
Obstruct
0
7 1 (n =
10)

Observers outside the legislature such as Lisa McGiffard of
31
the liberal Texas Consumers Union agreed with Krusee . Long
time House watcher and journalist Harvey Kronberg (2003)
wrote that the Democrats ' choice to submit hundreds of amendments in an effort to delay major bills proposed by Republicans
was an unprecedented use of the House rules. In response many
Republican s defied norms by bloc voting against all Democrat
amendrnents. 32 This included serious amendments proposed by
Democrat s. Republican s became frustrated with the Democrats '
attempts to obstruct legislation, as opposed to working to build
compromise and comity between the two parties . As a result they

30

Interview with Krusee.
Interview with Lisa McGiffard , policy analyst, Texas Consumers Union, Jun e 13,
2003 .
32
Bloc voting did occur, but it was neither universal nor so lely Republican. Democra tic
amendments to the tort reform bi II lost by votes ranging from 82 to I02.
31
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no longer recognized genuine attempts by Democrats to work
within the process.
All parties seemed to lose credibility because of the onslaught
of amendments. Speaker Craddick's inability to control the floor
made him seem weak even to fellow Republicans. Democrats '
tactics of delay through amendments hurt the chances of the
good ones they did propose. Republicans ' frustrated reaction to
the sheer volume of amendments made them act intransigent
when the Democrats offered good amendments. No one won .
The Texas House does not record floor votes unless there is
an appeal from the members. The call for recorded floor votes
rose during the 2003 session. Strong majorities of Republican
respondent groups and a bare majority of 2003 Democratic legislators and staffers emphasized that the call for recorded votes
was a device to politically embarrass their opponents or to demonstrate their efforts on their constituents' behalf. Few saw it as a
straightforward device to document important votes. The use of
recorded votes had not changed significantly from previous sessions. It has always been of "tactical use ... for campaigns." 33 It is
the frequency of its use that changed.
Quorum calls were generally not used to obstruct. However ,
the "quorum bust" conducted by 58 of the 62 Democrats in order
to prevent debate and vote on a pending redistricting bill tainted
responses to this issue. The quorum bust of Monday, May 17,
2003, was the first time that a group of House members had ever
shut down debate by preventing a quorum. By this time both
sides noted that there was little respect for each other, and that
civility had markedly declined on the floor and in the committee
hearing rooms. Political antagonism was morphing into personal
assaults. Antagonistic cooperation had disappeared .

JJ

Interv iew with Madden .
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There is some evidence to support the "DeLay" explanation
in the quorum bust. The so-called "Killer Ds," the quorum busting Democrats, asserted in their official statement for their absence that, "We did not choose our path. Tom Delay [sic] did it."
They charged that the redistricting proposal was "a power grab
by Tom DeLay, pure and simple." This "outrageous partisan action" forced them to flee to Oklahoma (Quorum Report, 2003b).
Minority Leader Jim Dunnam insisted that Speaker Craddick's
refusal to take redistricting off the table "tells us that Tom DeLay
is in charge" (quoted in Quorum Report, 2003d).
Table 6
Call for Recorded Floor Votes, 2003 & 2004
(in percents)

2003
Used for
Future
Electoral
Advantaee

Not Used
for Future
Electoral
Advantaee

Republican Legislators
12 (n = I)
88 (n = 7)
and Staffers
Democratic Legislators
50 (n = 2)
50 (n = 2)
and Staffers
*Note: No staffers were interviewed for the 2004 samele.

2004*
Used for
Future
Electoral
Advantaee

Not Used
for Futu re
Electoral
Advantaee

80(n=4)

20(n= I)

79(n=II)

21 (n = 3)

The unique character of this issue may be more important
than the presence or absence of Congressman Tom DeLay. Democrats felt compelled to make this drastic choice because of the
special salience of redistricting. Normally, one member's victory
in a legislature is not another member's defeat when appraised in
terms of electoral advantage. Indeed, a legislative defeat can be
used by a member running for re-election to mobilize support for
the member. However, redistricting can be a zero-sum game,
even when the fates at stake are members of your party's congressional rather than state House delegation. The Democrats
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recognized this. The Democrats in Oklahoma wrote a letter appealing to Speaker Craddick to take redistricting off the table.
They reassured the Speaker that "we are willing to give you our
word ... that we will not break quorum on other issues-even
when we disagree." 34 Congressional redistricting posed a unique
threat to Democratic interests and evoked a unique Democratic
response.
The tone of the House changed for the better after the quorum
bust. 35 Representative Pete Gallego (D-Alpine) said that there
was "no effort to be bipartisan until we returned ... [Speaker
Craddick] thought we were irrelevant until this point." 36 Redistricting did not come up again until the special sessions during
the summer.
Speaker Craddick sought to maintain earlier norms of bipartisanship by refusing to recognize Republican motions to suspend
the rules in order to consider bills that died due to deadlines expiring during the quorum bust. Such a suspension would have
been unprecedented. Republican legislators had pressed Speaker
Craddick to retaliate by jamming redistricting down the throats
of Democrats. Speaker Craddick told a closed meeting of the
Republican Caucus that there would be no retribution. Representative Krusee recounted, "The caucus supported him without reservation, if not without heartache" (quoted in Copelin, 2003). No
doubt the Speaker also recognized that few Democrats would
vote for suspending the rules, a motion requiring a two-thirds
vote.
34
Quorum Report (2003c) . The lone House member of either party to vote against Craddick ' s' election as Speaker saw it differently . ''The idea of walking out on Craddick and
Texas Republicans had been brewing for two months . 'It was only a question of when,
and over what issue, "' Representative Lon Burnam (D-Ft Worth) said . Quoted in Kennedy (2003) .
35
Interview with Kronberg .
36
Interview with Representative Pete Gallego (D-Alpine) , July 9, 2003.
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Representative Laney pointed out one significant change in
norms:
I never voted on a bill, maybe two or so times, in my whole
career as Speaker and other than that it was always to break
a tie. But Craddick voted many times. And he would do this
before members would vote, 'signaling' to them how they
should vote.37

This was a significant change, although there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that prior speakers were more involved than
Laney had been in the voting process. Nonetheless, Speaker
Craddick was not afraid to vote and to vote early. The change
may be reflective of personal style or institutional commitment.
As likely, and more generously, the change may be reflective of
the two different roles each speaker played. Laney was a speaker
presiding over a political and ideological status quo that he supported. Craddick was a speaker trying to challenge the status
quo. Laney presumed a consensus that had evaporated as Texas
and the House membership changed.
Conclusion
The consequences of changes in rules, norms, and procedures
were evident. Most respondents areed that there was less compromise and more confrontation. 3 Speaker Craddick remarked,
"rules usually only take one hour to pass and this year they took
a whole day." 39 "The process of negotiation and compromise ... were missing this session on the floor," Representative
Gallego observed. 40 While there are conflicting accounts identifying the precise culprits, there is no doubt some truth to indi37
38
39
40

Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview

with Laney.
with Speaker Pro Tern Sylvester Turner (D-Houston), July 25, 2003 .
with House Speaker Tom Craddick, June 26, 2003.
with Gallego .
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vidual explanations for increased partisanship . But broader explanations are more helpful.
The "Tom DeLay Did It" explanation is plainly applicable to
the legislative struggle over redistricting. However, while most
respondents agree that strong-arm partisan politics was the order
of the day on redistricting, we found little evidence to suggest
that this explanation explains the 2003 regular House session.
Partisanship developed early in the session before redistricting
became a contentious issue. DeLay may have simply tapped into
a tension already well developed in the House. The redistricting
explosion came from the developing tension. It did not alone
cause the tension .
Undoubtedly , Speaker Craddick and the House Republican
majority had much to learn. Speaker Craddick displayed a notable lack of finesse. Previous speakers would permit amendments
they did not like and just drop them in conference committee .41
The "growing pains" that all new leaders experience explained
some of the Speaker's problems . A more seasoned speaker would
have done more work on forging agreements before an issue
went to the floor. Not doing so made the Speaker and the Republicans appear inflexible and ideologically intolerant. 42 One respondent noted the chaotic referral of bills to committee with no
apparent reason as a prime example of inexperience. 43 The fact
that bills can be assigned to a variety of different committees
because of the overlapping jurisdiction of these committees
grants great power to the Speaker. The Speaker's over-ruling of
points of order was labeled "haphazard. He should have been
[sic] done more carefully." 44 Speaker Craddick was also criti41

'

2

43

44

Interview
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Interview
Interview
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with
with

Kronberg .
Slater .
McGiffard .
Madden .
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cized because he let Democrats propose and debate too many
frivolous amendments, making him appear not to be in control.
Every new Speaker has to learn how to run the House. Sympathizers invoked phrases such as "learning curve," 45 a "learning
process" 46 and the expectation that the Speaker's style would
change as he learned how to get things done. One legislator demurred. The legislative chaos was "not due to lack of experience." Representative Laney opined, it was "just the way he ran
the House, his style." 47
There is a curious twist in applying Fenno to the 2003 regular
Texas House session. While Fenno recognized the impact of an
inexperienced minority, his greatest emphasis was on the significance of an inexperienced majority. We find that the inexperience of the new minority in the Texas House was as important as
the majority's. The new Speaker did have to learn how to meld
his personal style, his party's agenda, and institutional demands,
but Speaker Craddick's learning curve was no steeper than new
speakers before him.
Fenno's explanation offers more insight into the problems experienced by the Democratic minority than the difficulties confronted by the Republican majority in the 2003 Texas House. He
properly points out that assuming the role of a majority after being out of power for a long time can be crippling. But learning to
be the majority may be easier than learning to be the minority
after being in power for 130 years. The majority can learn practical skills, such as how to run a floor debate. Some individual
legislators, Democrats and Republicans, sought to be "institutional partisans," especially the handful of Democrats, informally called "Craddick D's," whom the Speaker had appointed
45
46

•

1

Interview with Rains .
Interview with Madden.
Interview with Laney.
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to key leadership positions. But losing power is more difficult.
"When you lose power you lose influence," 48 and that is a blow
difficult to accept. Clearly, both the majority and the minority
party leaders adopted the "confrontational partisanship" Fenno
identified in the U.S. House in 1995.
The role reversal imposed on Republicans and Democrats had
a demonstrable effect on the 2003 regular session. Representative Arlene Wohlgemuth CR-Burleson) expressed the Republicans' conviction that it is the minority's job to compromise with
the majority.49 Republicans had to bend left to accommodate the
Democratic majority in earlier sessions. Now the Democrats,
Republicans said, must bend right to accommodate the new majority. The Democrats had to "learn to lose" 50 but "they lacked
the skills to be in the minority." 51 Not surprisingly, the Democrats did not see it that way. Representative Scott Hochberg (DHouston) asserted that the Democrats sought to find ways to win
within the system "but the only way to be effective was to work
against it."52
The group struggling most with its new role was the House
Democrats. The Democrats were divided. They could not decide
on one issue to push until congressional redistricting came on the
table. They also struggled to grasp that, when you are in the minority, learning to compromise is essential to governing . When
compromises must come from the weakened status of being a
new minority, it is hard to accept. The Republicans found it difficult to learn to govern as a responsible majority. The Democrats

48

lnterview with John Colyandro, Director, Texas Conservative Coalition , June 30, 2003 .
" lnterview with Wohlgemuth .
50
lnterview with Phillips .
51
interview with Madden.
52
Telephone interview with Representative Scott Hochberg (D-Houston), August 4,
2003 .
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had the challenging task of learning to constructively oppose the
majority in their role as the responsible minority.
The national trend toward increasing party competition for
state legislatures, accompanied by increasing partisan conflict
within state legislatures, has shifted members' concerns away
from the needs of the legislature as an institution to the specific
electoral and policy objectives of the party. In recent years the
Texas House has experienced this shift to a more electionoriented institution. Legislative party leaders in many states are
becoming preoccupied with campaigns and elections. This had
not been true for former Democratic speakers such as Pete
Laney. When you are the majority party for over 100 years there
is no apparent need to focus on electoral outcomes. But for a
long-suffering minority it is important that its leaders help facilitate campaign finances and focus on building the legislative
party. For years Craddick sought to build a Republican majority
in the Texas House. His success in 2003 strained civility in the
House. Electoral competition forced the handover of control
from Democrats to Republicans. Electoral stakes undermined
institutional loyalty and cross-party comity.
The Texas House experienced a tumultuous session for a variety of reasons: the budget crunch, the redistricting debacle, an
inexperienced majority and minority, the leadership style of the
new Speaker, and the inevitable tensions of a legislative session.
But the Texas House was also subject to forces far more typical
of contemporary state legislatures: increasing partisanship, declining civility, the impact of electoral calculations, and deinstitutionalization. State legislators now value the incentives to
ensure a stable institution less than they value the incentives
posed by partisan electoral and policy considerations. The legislature's environment penetrates its walls in ways that we have
not witnessed recently. This may lessen the legislature's capacity
to make bipartisan policy, but it also demonstrates the legislaTII E JOURNAL
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ture's openness to the society it helps to govern. The tradeoffs
between open and effective government are not new. It is, after
all, the dilemma of a legislature in a liberal democracy: how to
be representative of a society's diversity and concerns while remaining sufficiently organized to legislate effectively for that
society. The 2003 Texas House was no more able than any legislature to fully resolve this dilemma .
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